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Abstract
A question still debated within cognitive neuroscience is whether signals present during ac-
tions significantly contribute to the emergence of human’s body ownership. In the present
study, we aimed at answer this question by means of a neuropsychological approach. We
administered the classical rubber hand illusion paradigm to a group of healthy participants
and to a group of neurological patients affected by a complete left upper limb hemiplegia,
but without any propriceptive/tactile deficits. The illusion strength was measured both sub-
jectively (i.e., by a self-report questionnaire) and behaviorally (i.e., the location of one’s own
hand is shifted towards the rubber hand). We aimed at examining whether, and to which ex-
tent, an enduring absence of movements related signals affects body ownership. Our re-
sults showed that patients displayed, respect to healthy participants, stronger illusory
effects when the left (affected) hand was stimulated and no effects when the right (unaffect-
ed) hand was stimulated. In other words, hemiplegics had a weaker/more flexible sense of
body ownership for the affected hand, but an enhanced/more rigid one for the healthy hand.
Possible interpretations of such asymmetrical distribution of body ownership, as well as lim-
its of our results, are discussed. Broadly speaking, our findings suggest that the alteration of
the normal flow of signals present during movements impacts on human’s body ownership.
This in turn, means that movements have a role per se in developing and maintaining a co-
herent body ownership.
Introduction
Body ownership is the conscious experience of the body as one’s own [1]. Indeed, it is an ubiq-
uitous perceptual experience that stands at the root of human nature since we all sense what
it’s like having a body and we experience the boundaries between our own body and the exter-
nal world [2].
Recent theoretical and methodological advances have leaded to the development of new ap-
proaches to examine in depth the neurocognitive processes underpinning the conscious experience
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of one’s own body. Perhaps, one of the most compelling demonstration of the mechanisms sub-
serving body ownership has been obtained in healthy participants by means of an experimental
manipulation in which the physical constraints subserving body ownership are altered. Such para-
digm is known as the ‘rubber hand illusion’ [3]. Basically, it is shown that synchronous, but not
asynchronous, touches onto a static visible rubber hand and onto the static hidden participants’
hand produce the compelling change in the believes of ownership of that hand (e.g., [3–7]). The at-
tribution is typically measured both objectively (i.e., the perceived location of one’s own hand to-
ward the rubber hand) and subjectively (the experience of owning the rubber hand). It is worth
noticing that incongruent rubber hand postures, incongruent identity (e.g., neutral objects) does
not seem to induce the illusion (e.g., [8]). The rubber hand illusion effects are explained with the
fact that when the rubber hand is congruent with the participant’s hand in terms of posture and
identity, the conflict between somatosensory representations of the own hand and vision of the
fake hand disappears in favor of a strong multisensory integration (i.e., touch, proprioception and
vision). This, in turns, induces a unitary multisensory perception of the fake hand as one’s own
hand receiving the tactile stimuli [9,10]. Interestingly, other recent approaches have extended this
paradigm to the whole body by employing virtual reality [11,12].
The classical version of the rubber hand illusion paradigm [9,10] reveals that when visual
and tactile stimuli delivered to one‘s own body part match in terms of space, time and identity,
a feeling of ownership arises. However, human body receives stimulations also during actions
and, in fact, the feeling that one's body belongs to oneself is present also when we move: “I
know that this moving hand is mine”. In these situations, further signals add to vision and
touch: skin/joint receptors, muscles spindles give us kinesthetic information (see [13] for a re-
view). Additionally, during willed actions the brain process also centrally generated motor
commands (efferent signals) and the sensory predictions they produce (efference copy; see, for
instance [14]). Consistently with these observations, recent studies aimed at examining wheth-
er or not these other signals are as important as tactile ones in terms of body ownership devel-
opment [15–21]. Broadly speaking, most of those studies modified the original rubber hand
paradigm comparing active and passive movements conditions with the static version. Overall,
this literature presents conflicting results, that is some papers provided hints that body owner-
ship increases during movements [15,19,22], others that it decreases [20], and some others re-
ported no differences between movement and no-movement conditions [16,21].
Overall, at present there is no consensus on if, and to which extent, movements contribute
to the emergence of body ownership. In the present study, we aimed at answer this question
within a neuropsychological perspective. We selected patients affected by a pure form of left
hemiplegia, that is complete paresis of the left upper limb but no proprioceptive and/or tactile
deficits. In other words, these patients had been keeping to receive signals in static (touch and
vision) but not in dynamic (kinesthetic, efferent and efference copy) conditions. If movements
are necessary for the construction of body ownership, we predicted in patients, respect to
healthy subjects, 1) stronger rubber hand illusion effects for the left affected hand, and 2) simi-
lar illusory effects on the right unaffected hand. In other words, the hemiplegic hand would dis-
play a weaker or more flexible sense of body ownership, whereas the right unaffected hand the
same body ownership.
Materials and Methods
Participants
We retrospectively selected the participants of the study from a large sample of stroke patients
with right hemispheric lesions (documented by computerized tomography) and no history of
substance abuse/previous neurological diseases, admitted to different rehabilitation centers.
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The prerequisite to be included in this study was the presence of a complete left upper limb
hemiplegia and no tactile loss (in order to administer the rubber hand illusion paradigm).
Nonetheless, in order to focus entirely on the contribution of movements to body ownership,
we excluded all patients affected by propriceptive deficits, personal/extrapersonal neglect and
anosognosia for hemiplegia [23,24]. Eight right-handed patients (six men; mean age 63.6 years,
SD = 11.4 years; mean educational level 9.2 years, SD = 4 years; hereinafter HP group) and sev-
enteen (three subjects form the original samples of twenty were excluded as outliers) age and
educational level-matched right-handed healthy subjects (nine men; mean age 66.1 years, SD =
8 years; mean educational level 9.5 years, SD = 4.6 years; hereinafter C group) participated in
the study after having given written informed consent according to the declaration of Helsinki.
The study was approved by the ethic committee of the University of Turin (Project “Conscious
brain: neural basis of motor and body awareness”, prot. 1/2014/B1).
Neurological and neuropsychological assessment
Handedness was assessed with the Edinburg inventory [25], whereas patients’ screening for
global cognitive functioning was evaluated with the Italian version of the Mini Mental State Ex-
amination [26]. Contralesional motor, tactile and proprioceptive defects as well as unawareness
for motor deficits were assessed according to a standardized protocol [27,28] in which scores
range from 0 (no deficit) to 3 (severe deficit), whereas those for unawareness of hemiplegia
ranges from 0 (no deficit) to 2 (sever deficit). The presence of left extrapersonal neglect was as-
sessed with line bisection task [29] and a Diller cancellation [30] tasks, whereas the presence of
personal neglect was assessed with the Fluff test [31]. Patients’ demographic, clinical and
neuropsychological data are reported in Table 1.
Experimental settings and procedures
We employed a black wooden box (60 cm x 40 cm x 20 cm) divided in two equal parts (30 cm
x 30 cm x 20 cm) by a perpendicular panel. One of the two parts was open to the view. Two
square holes (12 cm x 12 cm) on either the horizontal sides of the box allowed placing both the
Table 1. Demographical, neurological and neuropsychological data of the HP group.
Id Sex Age Edu (y) Ons (days) Aet Lesion N.E. AHP MMSE Line bisection Diller Fluff
M T P
BM F 78 5 72 I Ic 3 0 0 0 26 8/9 2 0
BP M 77 17 69 I T, BG 3 0 0 0 28 8/9 2 0
CD M 64 8 46 I F, P 3 0 0 0 27 9/9 −1 0
MG M 63 8 258 I Bg 3 0 0 0 27 9/9 0 0
PA M 62 5 76 H Ic 3 0 0 0 28 9/9 0 0
PL M 69 10 91 I F, T, P 3 0 0 0 26 8/9 2 0
PF M 51 8 53 I Bg 3 0 0 0 27 9/9 0 0
ZE F 45 13 120 H F 3 0 0 0 25 9/9 0 0
Id = patients' Identification number. Sex: M = Male, F = Female. Edu: years (y) of formal education. Aet: Aetiology, H = hemorrhage, I = ischemia. Lesion:
F = frontal, T = temporal, P = parietal, Bg = basal ganglia, Ic = Internal capsule. Ons = Illness onset. N.E = Neurological examination, Contralesional Motor
(M), Tactile (T), and Proprioceptive (P) neurological deficits (the two values refer to the upper and lower limb respectively); scores ranged from normal (0)
to severe defects (3). AHP = Unawareness of hemiplegia (the two values refer to the upper and lower limb, respectively); scores ranged from normal (0) to
severe defects (2). MMSE: Mini-Mental State Exam score (0–30, cut off 24). Line bisection: number of correct bisections (0/9–9/9, the Behavioural
Inattention Test). Diller: left minus right omitted targets (0–52, cut off > 3 [54]). Fluff. Scores ranged from normal (0) to severe defects (3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117155.t001
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participant’s arm and the rubber hand (left or right). The set up included also an automotive
wooden panel (30 x 40) and a wooden stick (100 cm long) on which was previously applied a
tailor-ruler (0 to 100 cm). See Fig. 1.
The box was placed 15 cm in front of the participant’s torso and arranged to have the rubber
hand (left or right) aligned with the correspondent participants’ shoulder (left or right). Partici-
pants were familiarized with the setting, procedures and all rating scales. Then, the experiment-
er placed the participants’ arm (left or right) in a fixed location within the part of the
box hidden to the view. Fingers were pointing forward and palm was facing down. Then, the
rubber hand (left or right) was placed in the other half of the box (open to the view) parallel
and in the correspondence of the participants’ shoulder. The distance between the real and the
rubber hand was approximately 25 cm.
As first, the experimenter sat in front of the participant and placed the automotive panel on
the open part of the box in order to cover also the rubber hand. Then, the experimenter placed
on the top of the wooden box the stick. The participant had to report the number correspon-
dent to the position of their index finger (six trials), which was referred as the proprioceptive
judgement. In order to avoid number repetitions, the position of the stick was randomly varied
across trials.
Secondly, the experimenter removed the automotive panel and asked to participants to al-
ways look to the index fake finger during the subsequent stimulations. Then, the experiment
started to stroke both the participants’ index finger and the rubber hand index finger with two
equal small brushes for 180 sec. In the synchronous condition, the two hands (left or right)
were stimulated simultaneously (one trial for each hand), whereas in the asynchronous condi-
tion, the stimulations were temporally incongruent (one trial for each hand). See Fig. 2.
Thirdly, after each kind of stimulation, participants were asked to indicate the position of
their index finger on the ruler after the experimenter covered the rubber hand with the auto-
motive panel (i.e., proprioceptive judgment) and to fill out a questionnaire about the experi-
ence of the illusion [3]. The questionnaire was composed of six questions (see appendix), three
(Q1–Q3) to capture different aspects of the illusory perception (e.g., the sensation of touches
on the rubber hand and the change in the believes of ownership of that hand), whereas three
(Q4–Q6) served as control questions for task compliance and susceptibility effects. Participants
had to rate their agreement/disagreement on a seven point Likert scale with a range from “+3”
(agree very strongly) to “−3” (disagree very strongly) where “0@ corresponded to neither agree-
ing nor disagreeing.
Fig 1. Picture of the materials employed in the experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117155.g001
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In order to avoid any possible carry-over effects of the illusion, after each post stimulation
trial, participants had 60 sec of rest. Then, another pre-stimulation session preceded the next
post-stimulation trial.
In summary, there were four conditions randomized between subjects: left hand synchro-
nous stimulation, left hand asynchronous stimulation, right hand synchronous stimulation,
right hand asynchronous stimulation. The order of presentation of these four conditions was
randomized by balancing the order of the stimulated hand (left, right) and the order of stimula-
tion (synchronous or asynchronous) separately across subjects.
Statistical analysis
A preliminary analysis compared (t-test for independent samples by group) between groups
the pre stimulation proprioceptive judgment. Then, the pre stimulation values were subtracted
from the post stimulation values and referred as the proprioceptive drift [8,32]. Positive values
represented a mislocalization towards the rubber hand). The normality of the distribution of
the propriceptive drift values was evaluated by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, whereas the homo-
geneity of variance by means of the Brown-Forsythe-test particularly useful for unequal sample
sizes. According to these latter analysis, the proprioceptive drift was analyzed by means of a re-
peated measure’s ANOVA with GROUP (HP, C) as between subjects factor, STIMULATION
(synchronous, asynchronous) and HAND (left, right) as within subjects factors. Significant
level was set at p< .05, when a significant interaction was detected; post-hoc analysis were con-
ducted with Duncan test. Since with small sample sizes, the lack of significance might be due to
insufficient power, when required we performed retrospective power analysis (alpha level = .05)
in the HP group.
The subjective rating for each of the six questions was standardized by means of an ipsatiza-
tion procedure (see [33] details) useful to neutralize any bias of response). Then, the subjective
rating for each question was analyzed by means of a repeated measure’s ANOVA with GROUP
(HP vs. C) as between subjects factor, STIMULATION (synchronous, asynchronous) and
HAND (left, right) as within subjects factor. Significant level was set at p< .05, when a signifi-
cant interaction was detected; post-hoc analysis were conducted with Duncan test. When re-
quired we performed retrospective power analysis (alpha level = .05) in the HP group.
Fig 2. Picture of the experimental set-up. Left hand stimulation (Fig. 1A) and right hand stimulation
(Fig. 1B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117155.g002
Movements and Body Ownership
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0117155 March 16, 2015 5 / 12
Results
Proprioceptive drift
Pre stimulation proprioceptive judgment (p> .05) did not differ between groups (synchronous
left: C mean = 2.28, SD = 2.83; HP .29, 3.46. Asynchronous left: C 2.25, 3; HP 1.19, 3.27. Syn-
chronous right: C 1.06, 2.98; HP 1.92, 2.39. Asynchronous right: C 1.25, 2.83, HP 1.7, 2.14).
Since data were distributed normally (p> .05) and variances were homogenous (p> .1) be-
tween groups, we performed the 2x2x2 repeated measure’s ANOVA on the proprioceptive
drift (cm). The main factor STIMULATION was significant [F (1,24) = 28.72, p< .005] with
the drift being higher in the synchronous (mean = 1.97 cm, SE = .22 cm) respect to the asyn-
chronous (mean = .54 cm, SE = .28 cm) condition. However, the significance of the STIMULA-
TION x HAND x GROUP interaction [F (1,24) = 18.95, p< .001] revealed that in the HP
group such difference was present (post hoc, p< .005) only when the left affected hand was
stimulated (synchronous: 2.9, ± .48; asynchronous: .19 ±.38). Indeed, the drift in the synchro-
nous condition was higher (post hoc, p< .05) respect to when C group’s hands were stimulated
synchronously (left: 1.7, ± .32; right: 1.69, ± = .35), and HP group’s right unaffected hand was
stimulated synchronously (1.33, ± .53) or asynchronously (.98, ± = .46). On the contrary, when
the right hand was stimulated, the higher drift (post hoc, p< .005) in the synchronous respect
the asynchronous condition was present only in the C group (synchronous: 1.69, ± .35; asyn-
chronous: .28, ± .3). The between groups comparisons within each condition (i.e. synchronous
vs synchronous and asynchronous vs asynchronous) were not significant (post hoc, p> .05).
The retrospective power analysis (alpha level = .05) in the HP group when the right hand was
stimulated resulted in: Power .24, effect size = .51. See Fig. 3.
Fig 3. Graphic representation of the proprioceptive drift analysis on the two groups. Error bars
represent standard errors. Asterisks indicate significant comparisons (* p< 0.05** p< 0.01*** p< 0.005).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117155.g003
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Subjective rating
We performed the 2x2x2 repeated measure’s ANOVA on the subjective rating (z-score) for
each question separately.
In Q1, the main factor STIMULATION was significant [F (1,24) = 32.63, p< .005] with a
positive (presence of the illusion) and higher rating in the synchronous (Z = 1.45, SE = .15) re-
spect to the synchronous (.01, ± = .16) condition. The significance of the STIMULATION x
HAND x GROUP interaction [F (1,24) = 18.95, p = .047] revealed that in the HP group such
pattern was present (post hoc, p< .005) only when the left affected hand was stimulated (syn-
chronous: .19, ± .29; asynchronous: −.04 ± .32). On the contrary, when the right hand was
stimulated, the pattern was present (post hoc, p< .05) only in the C group (synchronous:
.15, ± .23; asynchronous: .02 ± .02). The retrospective power analysis (alpha level = .05) in the
HP group when the right hand was stimulated resulted in: Power .3, effect size = .36.
Respect to Q2, the main factor STIMULATION was significant [F (1,24) = 26.39, p< .005]
with a positive and higher rating in the synchronous (.65, ± .15) respect to the asynchronous
(−.3, ± .09) condition.
In Q3, the main factor STIMULATION was significant [F (1,24) = 27.95, p< .005] with a
positive and higher rating in the synchronous (.86, ± .01) respect to the asynchronous (−.21, ± .14)
condition. However, the significance of the STIMULATION x HAND x GROUP interaction
[F (1,24) = 18.44, p< .005] revealed that in the HP group such pattern was present (post hoc,
p< .005) only when the left affected hand was stimulated (synchronous: 2.09, ± .43; asynchro-
nous: −.19 ± .26). Indeed, the drift in the synchronous condition was higher (post hoc, p< .05)
respect to when C group’s hands were stimulated synchronously (left: .61, ± .28; right: .7, ± =
.19), and HP group’s right unaffected hand was stimulated synchronously (.03, ± .3) or asyn-
chronously (−.32, ± = .24). On the contrary, when the right hand was stimulated, the pattern
was present (post hoc, p< .05) only in the C group (synchronous: .69, ± .2; asynchronous:
−.21 ± .17). The retrospective power analysis (alpha level = .05) in the HP group when the right
hand was stimulated resulted in: Power .25, effect size = .52). None of the analysis on the other
questions resulted to be significant. See Fig. 4.
Discussion
With the present investigation, we aimed at analyzing whether signals arising from movements
(i.e., kinesthetic, efferent and efference copy) affect body ownership. We administered the rub-
ber hand illusion paradigm to a subgroup of neurological patients who, due to their hemiplegia,
had not been keeping to receive signals during movements on their plegic hand. Our results
Fig 4. Graphic representation of subjective rating analysis on the two groups. Error bars represent
standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0117155.g004
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show that, respect to healthy participants, the illusory effects were higher when the affected
hand was stimulated, but absent when the unaffected hand was stimulated.
As first, in our study we replicated on healthy participants the typical pattern of the rubber
hand illusion for both hands [3–7]. Specifically, after synchronous, but not asynchronous stim-
ulation, the perceived position of the stimulated hand resulted to be shifted much closer to the
rubber hand. Consistently, only the three statements known to be linked to the subjective expe-
rience of the illusion resulted to have a positive value, namely participants had the change in
the belief of ownership over the rubber hand. As regards hemiplegic patients, they displayed
the same abovementioned pattern when the left affected hand was stimulated. It is worth not-
ing that groups were equally able in recognizing the temporal synchrony and spatial matching
between the observed and felt touch on the left hand (no between groups difference as regards
Q1 and Q2).
Nonetheless, the effect of synchronous stimulation on the perceived location of the own
hand was significantly higher than the one observed in healthy participants (i.e., the left affect-
ed hand was significantly more displaced towards the rubber hand). On the contrary, when the
right unaffected) hand was stimulated, synchronous and asynchronous stimulation did not dif-
fer in terms of perceived position of the stimulated hand and no statements resulted to have a
positive value (i.e., patients did not experience the change in the believes of ownership over the
rubber hand).
The idea that movements can shape the subjective experience of the body as one’s own is
mainly based on the fact that human’s body is the interface between the environment and the
phenomenal self [34]. Indeed, willed actions represent the translation from the phenomenal
states (desires, goals, intentions) into effects on the external world. In other words, human’s
body ownership might also rely on the functional relevance of the physical body [35] and, in-
deed, human’s body is largely given to us as a source or power for action, namely a range of
motor potentialities which defines our world by populating it with bodies and objects we can
interact with [36]. As we mentioned above, some studies employing a modified version of the
original rubber hand paradigm showed that signals arising during actions crucially contribute
to the development of the brain’s sense of body ownership. Specifically, Dummer and col-
leagues [15] reported that when healthy participants controlled a movement employed to in-
duce the illusion of body ownership over the rubber hand, the illusory effects increased of
around 23% respect to when the movements were passive. Similarly, Riemer and coworkers
[22] demonstrated that the proprioceptive drift was stronger in actively moving rubber hand il-
lusion respect to the classical version, when tested with a manual pointing procedure. Indeed,
the possible link between movements and body ownership has been demonstrated by means of
experimental manipulations different from the rubber hand illusion. Romano and coworkers
[37], for instance, showed that the observation in a mirror box of the reflected opposite arm
elicits involuntary movements. Newport and colleagues [38] reported that synchronous strok-
ing induces not only the embodiment of a fake limb but affects also subsequent motor perfor-
mance (i.e. reaching error). Rognini and co-workers [39] showed in a virtual reality set up that
visuo-tactile integration subserving body ownership is modulated by self-generated move-
ments [39].
Interestingly, Tsakiris and colleagues [19] made a step forward attributing to voluntary ac-
tions a specific role in building up body ownership. They demonstrated that the drift in the ac-
tive movement condition involved both the unstimulated and stimulated fingers, whereas the
drift in passive movement condition was strictly localized on the stimulated finger. Hence, the
authors claimed that while sensory mechanisms generate a sense of body ownership rooted on
fragmented and/or local representation of single body parts, voluntary actions would spread
across the whole body inducing a coherent sense of bodily self. In other words, the feeling of
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unity of bodily self-consciousness would derive from action, and not from sensation, and willed
actions would constantly provide precise spatio-temporal signals available to predict proprio-
ceptive and/or visual feedbacks.
The above-mentioned literature suggests that it is predictable that an enduring absence of
movements might interrupt the flow between accurate spatio-temporal information and pre-
dictions of feedbacks. This, in turn, might affect body ownership per se. Accordingly, some re-
cent studies on clinical populations with movement disorders seem to suggest that this might
be the case. Patients with focal hand dystonia [40] or spinal cord injury [41,42], for instance,
seems to have impairment of body ownership measured with the rubber hand illusion. Interest-
ingly, it has been showed that an altered body ownership can affect voluntary actions: the path-
ological embodiment of someone else’s arm due to brain damages [23,43,44] can affects the
patients’ motor program [45].
Consistently with these observations and with our prediction 1), hemiplegic patients pre-
sented stronger rubber hand illusion effects on their left affected hand. We suggest that com-
plete hemiplegia pulls off the movements of the contralesional arm and decreases the number
of movement-related signals, progressively disrupting the normal integration between afferent
and efferent signals for that arm. This, in turn, weakens body ownership, which causes the
hemiplegic hand to be more prone to the illusory effect. It is worth noting that in a previous
study [42] on a spinal cord injury patient who still experienced the rubber hand illusion for the
deafferented body parts, results were explained as a consequence of a pathological dominance
of vision over proprioceptive/somatosensory information per se, rather than in terms of ab-
sence of movements (see also [46,47] for similar interpretations). Contrary to this study, our
patients had a complete preserved proprioceptive and somatosensory functioning. Hence, de-
spite a possible role of vision should be examined in the next future, it seems more likely to ex-
plain the results of the comparison between patients and controls in terms the only difference
between them, i.e., an enduring absence of movements, rather than in terms of full dominance
of vision.
Contrary to prediction 2), however, patients did not show any effect on the right hand. Here
we might attempt to speculate on a possible interpretation of this unexpected result. The vast
majority of everyday life movements requires (at least) some degree of collaboration between
hands and truly unimanual activities are difficult to be found [48]. Such activity is automatic
and finely coordinated in both temporal and spatial terms. Hence, stroke-induced unilateral
motor deficits force to a regular and repeated overuse of the healthy arm in order to achieve ac-
tions. Indeed, sometimes this induces transient abnormalities on that arm [49,50]. Hence, here
we put forward the idea that an increasing number of movement-related signals, and the conse-
quent heighten of the normal integration between afferent and efferent signals due to the unaf-
fected arm overuse, would enhance body ownership. This would explain the decrease of the
rubber hand illusion effects. Put in other words, such asymmetry of available signals might
modulate body ownership in opposite directions, that is weakening it for one arm, enhancing it
for the other. However, this second conclusion should be taken very cautiously. As first, our in-
terpretation is motor in nature, but we have not assessed movements. Hence, other possible,
more parsimonious, explanations must be discussed. One might argue, for instance, that right
arm overuse might have simply induced a motor expertise gain. Similarly, the overuse might
have leaded hands asymmetries in positions sense [51]. In both cases, one would have expected
different accuracy in detecting hand positions. However, before stroking healthy subjects and
hemiplegic patients were equally accurate in reporting their real hand position (both of the left
and right hand). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the absence of evidence is not evi-
dence of absence, particularly when negative results have low power as in our study. In other
words, it is not possible to clearly exclude that also in patients synchronous vs. asynchronous
Movements and Body Ownership
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stimulations over the right unaffected hand differed one from the other. It is worth noticing
that the main reason of the lack of power of patients’ right hand results is that our analysis is
based on a quite small group. It is worth noticing that we have focused only on patients with
complete left upper limb hemiplegia but without any kinesthetic/tactile loss. Indeed, these defi-
cits are often associated is difficult to obtain a large sample of patients in a reasonable time.
Future studies should add evidence to the idea of an important role of actions on the devel-
opment of body ownership and should also assess the specific contributions of kinesthetic, ef-
ferent and efference copy information. An interesting possibility to obtain larger groups might
be examining other conditions of arm use/disuse as, for instance, long-term arms immobiliza-
tion (e.g., [52,53]). Interestingly, these approaches would also allow to easily control the impact
of time. Indeed a correlation between immobilization time and altered body ownership
is expected.
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